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17. THE LAW OF RECONSTITUTION OF THE EXPERIENCING PROCESS.An individual can symbolize only those aspects which are already implicitly functioning in ongoing experiencing.. v/ T5 I2 t+ j
In any experiencing (that is to say, in any ongoing interaction of feeling and events) a great many implicit meanings are process aspects (so-called "contents"). Thus, for any moment's ongoing experiencing one can symbolize a great many contents. These are incomplete (definition 5) until some symbols (or events) carry forward the process in these respects.1 h/ `: _) w; S2 b" I  _
Thus there are two different definitions: to carry forward, and to reconstitute. To "carry forward" means that symbols (or events) occur to interact with already implicitly functioning aspects of ongoing experiencing. To "reconstitute" means that the process has become ongoing and implicitly functions in respects in which it previously was not ongoing.
$ B; ^, K; m% A6 M1 r# UWe can now state a law of the reconstitution of experiencing process: When certain implicitly functioning aspects of experiencing are carried forward by symbols or events, the resulting experiencing always involves other sometimes newly reconstituted aspects which thereby come to be in process and function implicitly in that experiencing.
9 f# X2 a9 R- L0 t2 g, J18. HIERARCHY OF PROCESS ASPECTS.If contents are viewed as process aspects -- that is to say, as implicitly functioning aspects of ongoing experiencing -- then the law of reconstitution implies that certain contents (process aspects) must be symbolized before certain other contents (process aspects) can thereby become process aspects. that are capable of being symbolized.8 w  m7 y- J' R% c$ j  ]
This fact gives the individual's self-exploration an ordered or hierarchical character. It is as if he can "get to" certain things-only via certain other things. We must let him travel his "own road," not because we believe in democracy, and not because we like self-reliance, but because only when the experiencing process has been reconstituted, so that certain aspects become implicit in it, can he symbolize these.+ C, `2 b% x2 g; {1 R8 ?
19. SELF-PROCESS.To the extent that experiencing does implicitly function, the individual may respond to himself and may carry forward his own experiencing. This interaction of the individual's feelings with his own (symbolic or actual) behavior,[17] we term "self." A more exact term: self-process.8 H- d) R' t8 m8 ]! w9 o+ m8 T9 M
To the extent that experiencing does not implicitly function, the individual cannot respond to himself and carry forward his experiencing In what ever respects it does not function (is structure bound), responses are needed first to reconstitute the interaction process of experiencing in these respects.5 [9 Y' {+ \6 W- a4 E; u
Why is it that the individual himself does not carry forward his already implicitly functioning experiencing in ways which would newly reconstitute structure-bound aspects of it? Of course, he cannot respond to the structure-bound aspects, as such (they are not implicitly functioning), but neither can the psychotherapist. The psychotherapeutic response can be defined as one which responds to aspects of experiencing which are implicitly functioning, but to which the individual himself tends not to respond. More precisely, his own response is a whole frozen structure which does not carry forward the felt experiencing process in these respects.% x3 ~- ~5 g9 K2 x. l3 \9 `) l% }
20. THE RECONSTITUTING RESPONSE IS IMPLICITLY INDICATED.The response which will reconstitute the experiencing process (in some now structure-bound respect) is already implied[18] in the individual's experiencing. One must respond to the functioning experiencing, not to the structure. In practice this means that one must take at face value and give a personal response to the functioning aspect of the person. No one is greatly changed by responses and analyses of how he does not function (though we are often tempted in this direction). We see that the individual's work behavior actually defeats his desire to work, that his s-e-xual behavior turns away opportunities for genuine s-e-xuality, that his desire to please makes him annoy people, that his way of reaching out to people actually turns people away, that his self-expression is dramatized and hollow. Yet these structures are his responses to his actually functioning desire to work, his actually functioning s-e-xuality, his actually functioning desire to relate to people and be close to them, and his actual self-expressive urge. Only if we respond to these actually functioning aspects of his experiencing (despite the obviously opposite character of his behavior and symbolic self-responding) can we carry forward what is now actual and reconstitute the process where he himself had (symbolically and actually) responded only with structure.
9 o. i$ B( s0 \- X" ^/ A; X21. PRIMACY OF PROCESS.We tend to neglect the fact that contents are process aspects. We pay the most attention to contents as symbolized meanings with specific logical implications (which they also are). Hence we often discuss self-exploration as if it were purely a logical inquiry in search of conceptual answers. However, in psychotherapy (and in one's private self-exploration as well) the logical contents and insights are secondary. Process has primacy. We must attend and symbolize in order to carry forward the process and thereby reconstitute it in certain new aspects. Only then, as new contents come to function implicitly in feeling, can we symbolize them.! P1 O/ ?/ r* e0 n7 E
In definition 9 we noted that "unfolding" can occur as a felt "now I've got it," quite without symbolization. This is a direct experience of reconstituting. The process is felt as ongoing in newly reconstituted respects. Reconstituting occurs when one symbolizes meanings which, in the previous moments, have already been implicit. The carrying forward of these implicit meanings turns out to involve the wider process which reconstitutes the new aspects./ W5 N0 f0 A( l: f) q
In psychotherapy, therefore, the situation is not that first we figure out what is wrong with an individual and how he must change-and then, somehow, he does it. Rather, his experiencing with us is already vitally different with us than it previously could be. From this different experiencing arise the solutions of his problems. The changes are already occurring as he speaks. Our responses (as verbal symbols and as events) interact and carry forward his experiencing. Our gestures and attitude, the very fact that he is talking to us, the differences which each moment he makes to us-all of this interacts concretely with what implicitly functions in him, his felt experiencing. Conceptually it may look like a futile statement and restatement of problems. Or, conceptually, we may arrive at the most basic causes and factors-the ways in which an individual ought to change, the reasons and lacks which prevent him from so changing-but no genuine solution is conceptually arrived at. The conceptual search ends by shrugging and attaching some blameful label to the individual who, through bad will or constitution, is said to lack these or those basic essentials. Yet, given certain interpersonal responses, he is already different.
4 H4 _3 o' @" E* d. P. Z8 rBy primacy of process over conceptual content, we mean this fact: [19] The presently ongoing experiencing process must be carried forward concretely. Thereby it is in many respects reconstituted, made more immediate in its manner of experiencing, more full of differentiable detail. Thereby new process aspects (contents), "solutions," and personality changes arise. Most often these solutions seem terribly sim-ple,[20] conceptually (see definition 9), and cannot possibly be the reason for the change. Rather, they are rough conceptualizations of a few aspects of a broadly different process.

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22. PROCESS UNITY. There is a single process which involves all of the following: environmental interaction, body life, feeling, cognitive meanings, interpersonal relations, and self. The concretely occurring process is one, although we can isolate and emphasize these various aspects of it. Our "thing Language" tends to present whatever we discuss as if it were a separable object in space. In this way we artificially separate environment, body, feeling, meanings, other people, and self.[21] When they are discussed as separable things, their obvious interrelations become puzzling: How can feelings be involved in (psychosomatic) body illnesses? How can cognitive thought be influenced by felt needs? How is it that expressing ourselves interpersonally results in changes in the self? At every juncture the "separate thing" view of these phenomena builds these puzzles into our discussions. Instead we can employ a frame of reference which considers the one process which concretely occurs. I want to give the name process unity to the way in which the one concrete process is basic to these various aspects. We have tried to show that feeling is a bodily affair, an aspect of physiological process. We have shown that cognitive meanings consist not only of verbal or pictorial symbols, but also of a felt sense which is implicitly meaningful and must function in interaction with symbols. Interpersonal responses (like other types of events) can interact with feeling and carry forward the concrete process. Now we will try to show that the self (the individual's own responses to his implicitly functioning experiencing) is also an aspect of the one concretely felt process, continuous with body, feeling, meanings, and interpersonal relations. 23. THE SELF PROCESS AND ITS INTERPERSONAL CONTINUITY. Throughout this discussion we have been dealing with one concretely occurring interaction process between feeling and events. Interpersonal events occur before there is a self. Others respond to us before we come to respond to ourselves. If these responses were not in interaction with feeling-if there were nothing but other people's responses as such-the self could become nothing but the learned responses of others. But interpersonal responses are not merely external events. They are events in interaction with the individual's feeling. The individual then develops a capacity to respond to his feeling. The self is not merely a learned repertoire of responses, but a response process to feeling. If feeling did not have implicit meaning, then all meaning would depend totally on the events or responses which occur. Again then, the self could never become anything but the repetition of the responses of others. The individual would always have to interpret himself and shape his personal meanings just as others had interpreted him. But feeling has implicit meanings. Therefore, to the extent that a feeling process is ongoing, we can further respond to it differently than others have. However, to the extent to which we respond to our own feeling so as to skip or stop the process rather than carry it forward, to that extent we need others to help us be ourselves. Not only the genesis, but the adult development of the self also may require interpersonal responses. Such responses are required not because of their appraisal or content, but because we need them concretely to reconstitute the feeling process. If in certain respects the process is not ongoing when we are alone, it does not help to recite to ourselves some content or happy appraisal which we may remember from a person with whom we felt "more ourselves"; that person's effect on us was brought about not by his appraisal or evaluation, which we can recite to ourselves. Rather, the effect occurred through his responses to our concrete feeling process and, in some respects, reconstituted it and carried it forward. If we can do that alone, we are independent selves in that respect. Thus, personality change in us is not a result of our perceiving another's positive appraisals of us or attitudes toward us. It is true that rejecting attitudes toward us are unlikely to carry forward our implicit meanings. However, that is not because of the negative appraisal as such, but because rejection usually ignores the implicit meanings of my feeling. To reject is to turn away or push away. In contrast, someone's "unconditional positive regard" toward us is not only an appraisal or attitude. They respond and carry forward the concretely ongoing process with their responses. We must, therefore, reformulate Rogers' (1959b) view that personality change depends on the client's perception of the therapist's attitudes. The present theory implies that the client may perceive the therapist's attitudes correctly, or he may not. He may be convinced that the therapist must dislike him and cannot possibly understand him. Not these perceptions, but the manner of process which is actually occurring, will determine whether personality change results. In many cases, the client can perceive positive therapist attitudes only after the concrete personality change process has already occurred. The change-effective factor is not the perception of a content, an appraisal, an evaluation, or ad attitude, considered apart from the concrete process. Personality change is the difference made by your responses in carrying forward my concrete experiencing. To be myself I need your responses, to the extent to which my own responses fail to carry my feelings forward. At first, in these respects, I am "really myself" only when 1 am with you. For a time, the individual can have this fuller self-process only in just this relationship.[22] That is not "dependence." It should not lead one to back away, but to fuller and deeper responses carrying forward the experiencing, which, for the time being, the individual says he can feel "only here." The continued carrying forward into ongoing interaction process is necessary to reconstitute the experiencing long enough for the individual himself to obtain the ability to carry it forward as self-process. Repression and Content Definitions Reformulated 24. THE UNCONSCIOUS AS INCOMPLETE PROCESS. When "ego" or "self-system" are said to "exclude" some experiences from awareness, usually it is assumed that these experiences nevertheless exist "in the unconscious" or "in the organism." Our discussion, however, leads us to the conclusion that they do not. Something exists, to be sure, but it is not the experiences as they would be if they were optimally ongoing. Rather, what exists is a felt and physiological condition which results when, in some regards, the body interaction process is stopped - i.e., is not occurring. What kind of condition is that? We have shown how the resulting dysfunction will be such that something is "missing," but we should not place what is missing into the unconscious (any more than we should place eating into the unconscious when someone is hungry). Rather, the unconscious consists of the body's stopped processes, the muscular and visceral blockage--just as a stopped electric current does not consist of a current that is going on under cover, but rather of certain electric potentials which build up in various parts (not only at the interruption) of the circuit. When a conductor re-establishes the electric current, different events occur than were occurring in its interrupted condition--yet, of course, the two are related. We say that this is the electrical energy which existed (in static form) before the current was reconstituted. This is "the unconscious." When we say that certain experiences, perceptions, motives, feelings, etc. are "missing" from our awareness, it is not that they exist "below" awareness (somewhere under there in the body or in an unconscious). Rather there is a narrowed, or in some respects blocked, interaction and experiencing. The manner of experiencing which we have described is one in which, in a good many regards, the experiencing and body life process is not "completed" or fully ongoing. Does this mean that there is no "unconscious"? Only what we are aware of exists? To put the matter in that too sim-ple way ignores important observations. The present theory must be able to account for these observations.[23] Therefore, we are basically reformulating the theory of the unconscious rather than in any sim-ple way throwing it out. The unconscious is redefined as incomplete process. Since there is no sharp distinction between carrying forward what is implicitly felt, and reconstituting experiencing in previously stopped respects (the former will involve the latter),[24] the felt datum which is there, in a sense, contains everything. In what sense does it? In the sense that, given fully carrying forward responses to it, everything will be here as aspects of ongoing process. Therefore, in practice the rule is: "Never mind what is not being felt. Respond to what is being felt."

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25. EXTREME STRUCTURE-BOUND MANNER OF EXPERIENCING (PSYCHOSES, DREAMS, HYPNOSIS, CO2, LSD, STIMULUS DEPRIVATION).
% r1 i" }3 H4 M% ]5 n' D3 MThroughout, we have been discussing the felt, implicit functioning of the interaction process we term "experiencing." We have been pointing out that all appropriate behavior and interpretations of present situations depend on this felt functioning. It constitutes the thousands of meanings and past experiences which determine appropriate present behavior. In addition, it is this felt functioning to which we can respond ourselves, and this is the self-process. The functioning I am discussing is felt, meaning that we can refer to it ourselves. For example, as we read this page the words are sound images for us. These sound images are all we explicitly have in mind. However, we also have the meanings of the sound images. How? We do not say to ourselves what it all means. We feel the meanings of what we read as we go along. They function implicitly. This feeling process is an interaction between the symbols on the page and our feeling. This felt interaction process is now ongoing and gives us appropriate feelings and meanings.

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25. EXTREME STRUCTURE-BOUND MANNER OF EXPERIENCING (PSYCHOSES, DREAMS, HYPNOSIS, CO2, LSD, STIMULUS DEPRIVATION).Throughout, we have been discussing the felt, implicit functioning of the interaction process we term "experiencing." We have been pointing out that all appropriate behavior and interpretations of present situations depend on this felt functioning. It constitutes the thousands of meanings and past experiences which determine appropriate present behavior. In addition, it is this felt functioning to which we can respond ourselves, and this is the self-process. The functioning I am discussing is felt, meaning that we can refer to it ourselves. For example, as we read this page the words are sound images for us. These sound images are all we explicitly have in mind. However, we also have the meanings of the sound images. How? We do not say to ourselves what it all means. We feel the meanings of what we read as we go along. They function implicitly. This feeling process is an interaction between the symbols on the page and our feeling. This felt interaction process is now ongoing and gives us appropriate feelings and meanings.9 W4 [4 o' z  N9 o; F5 C4 E1 h( b
When the interaction process is greatly curtailed (as in sleep, hypnosis, psychosis, and isolation experiments), the inwardly felt experiencing is thereby curtailed. The individual then lacks the implicit function of felt experiencing and loses both his sense of "self" and his capacity to respond to and interpret present events appropriately. Both require the felt process just illustrated.2 J6 ]9 z3 G. l
The peculiar phenomena which occur under these circumstances are somewhat more understandable when they are considered in terms of curtailment or stoppage of the interaction process and implicit function of felt experiencing.
7 D, D, m4 O1 d  J0 r8 MI would like now to state some of the characteristics of this (hallucinatory or dreamlike) extreme structure-bound manner of experiencing.
$ w& l3 d6 E# C/ F( T7 I, w' xStructures Are Perceived as Such. Ordinarily, past experiences and learnings function implicitly in felt experiencing, so that we interpret and perceive the present, not the past experiences themselves. Yet under hypnosis, in dreams, and in hallucinations, we may perceive rigid structures and past events as such. Characteristically, we do not then have the relevant aspects of felt process which usually function. Thus hallucinations and dreams are not understandable to the present individual. He is puzzled or aghast at them. They often seem to him "not his." The felt experiencing that would give him a sense of their being "his," and would let him know their meaning, is not ongoing. Dreams and hallucinations are, so to speak, decomposed pieces of what would otherwise be a functioning, felt process. This interaction process with the present is not ongoing, and hence the felt meanings are not functioning.
9 x: Y% C3 X2 e) D  L! \* a1 A- `Let me now trace through these several different kinds of circumstances how in each the interaction process is first curtailed, and how in each the function of felt experiencing is then missing.

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Extreme Structure-Bound Manner Occurs Whenever the Interaction Process is Greatly Curtailed. Dreams, hypnosis, psychosis, C02 and LSD, and stimulus deprivation share at least one factor, the curtailment of ongoing interaction.. n; s! k0 V, p, N6 C
3 W# \, J0 ^2 r0 }
In sleep there is a great reduction of external stimuli. Dreams occur with this curtailment of the usually ongoing interaction process with the environment.
) s+ I0 h3 \' h' h' m% S
+ _1 E: d2 ]7 \7 t6 vIn hypnosis, too, the subject must shut off his interaction with present stimuli, and must cease his own self-responsiveness. He must concentrate on a point.
* ^: u9 x6 {0 k  J6 l9 E
9 h( F: g% Q) JPsychosis, as has often been remarked (for example, Shlien, 1960), involves both in its genesis and later, an "isolation," a curtailment of interaction between feeling and events. Also, physical isolation from people can, in some individuals, bring on hallucinations.
7 {+ M( i2 Q" h- d' T
6 F$ n2 A& e9 I. j0 c1 Z: mCertain poisons (C02, LSD) are inimical to the physiological interaction process of body life. C02 narrows (and eventually stops) the process of respiration.2 m- c4 q4 N2 L6 o! T) ]
" R0 u& a' _9 b% p
Experiments in which individuals are placed in soundproof and lightproof suits that also prevent touch stimuli result (after a few hours) in psychotic-like hallucinations.
6 U5 B3 E5 }& J" L9 x' W
& {) o2 M8 `! VThe peculiarly similar experiences which arise under these widely different conditions hint at something similar. At least one factor they all share is the curtailment of the ongoing interaction process which, as felt, is experiencing. We would thus expect a lack of the implicit functioning which ongoing experiencing usually provides.
" u( L6 e9 U6 P" v2 @1 x
4 t! o5 A( o$ P! BAnd indeed this is shared by the phenomena which occur in all these circumstances. The peculiar character of these phenomena is understandable as a rigidity or lack of this felt functioning which usually interprets every present situation for us, and to which we respond in self-process. Thus appropriate interpreting of situations and sense of self are lost.
( ~7 D' p" a& N
# W) I# X! |5 s0 }% W( u# d. XLack of Implicit Function. The implicit function (see definition 4) of felt experiencing becomes rigid (not in process) or "literal" in all these conditions. In hypnosis, for example, when the individual is told to "raise your hand," he will lift the palm of his hand up by his wrist. He will not, as when awake, interpret the idiomatic phrase appropriately (it means, of course, to raise one's whole arm up into the air). The same "literal" quality occurs in dreams and in psychosis. Much of what has been called "primary process," "schizophrenic thinking," or the schizophrenic's inability to "abstract" his "concrete" thinking, his "taking the part for the whole" (Goldstein, 1954), really consists of this literal and rigid manner in which experiencing functions. As in dreams and hypnosis, the felt process of experiencing is curtailed and does not provide its implicit functioning.$ E; m" f8 |* \: a8 _+ I0 ~. I- Q
; s3 F! R$ N# z) o
The many implicit felt meanings that are needed for appropriate interpretations and reactions do not function, since the felt process (of which they are process aspects) is not ongoing. That is exactly what "literal" means: the lack of functioning of other meanings which should inform our interpretation of a given set of words or events.
) v! B# |( j( o1 m
3 V+ x! F' j* t; l% k) `/ v"Loss of Self." Another characteristic shared by dreams, hypnosis, psychosis, and the phenomena obtained in stimulus-deprivation and LSD, is the loss of a sense of self. In dreams what we perceive is beyond the control, interpretation, ownership, of the self (or ego). In hypnosis the individual specifically accepts another's suggestions for his own and totally permits them to replace his own self-responding. And in psychosis so often the patient complains: "I didn't do that. Something made me do it"; or "I'm not myself"; or "These voices are not mine"; or, "Inside me I'm nothing at all." The hallucinations, voices, and things in his head are not felt to be his own. He lacks the sense of self. If he does have a sense of self (an "intact ego"), this felt sense does not inform the hallucinatory phenomena. In regard to these, he has no sense of self that implicitly contains their meaning.
- {' h) x/ X8 X- D7 {+ w9 e: G0 q: j* r5 R
This loss of self is due to the missing felt functioning of experiencing. Just as outward events (to the extent of psychosis) are not interpreted and interacted with on the basis of felt experiencing, so also this felt experiencing ii missing for self-responses.
/ V  m; I# N, e
; D/ \" s" g5 I$ f- b) n, [% qWe have defined the self as self-process. The self exists to the extent that the individual can carry his felt process forward by means of his own symbols, behaviors, or attention. Experiments with stimulus deprivation have found that individuals who develop psychosis more slowly have a greater capacity to respond to themselves (the most "imagination" and "creativity;" it was called). The finding would corroborate our views since, to the extent the individual can carry forward his own experiencing, he will be maintaining (by symbols and attention) his interaction process. When the interaction process is greatly narrowed, not only do psychotic-like experiences occur, but the sense of "self" is lost. The felt process to which there can be self-response becomes static and the individual has unowned perceptions.

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Static, Repetitious, Unmodifiable Manner. Insofar as the implicit function of felt experiencing is rigid, there is no way for present situations to interact with it, and to modify it so that it becomes an interpretation of the present situation. Instead we perceive a repetitious pattern that is not modified by the present situation. The sequence may "go off" as a result of being "cued" by present events, but it is not an interpretation of, or response to, present events.
9 T7 H% X$ a2 x! D* O/ qThe Universality of Psychotic "Contents." Experiences in the extreme structure-bound manner are not process aspects. They occur precisely to the extent that the felt process is not ongoing. It is striking how certain themes universally recur-usually the familiar "oral, anal, and genital" themes. It seems that this is the stuff of which we are all composed . . . and into which the usually ongoing process decomposes, insofar as it is not ongoing.
- x  ?1 C$ K* ]! P1 oPsychotic Experiences Are Not "the Repressed." It is fallacious to consider these structure-bound manifestations as repressed experiences which have now "emerged" or "erupted." To so consider them raises the puzzling question: On the one hand many theories hold that adjustment requires awareness, and that repression makes maladjustment, but on the other hand they hold that the psychotic is "too aware" and needs to "rerepress" all these experiences.
* j: f4 b, z, x1 W* OA better formulation, I think, would be to interpret this observation as follows: Optimally these universal past experiences function implicitly in felt experiencing. When that ongoing process ceases, decomposed static patterns occupy the center of the sensorium.! R# n& h9 v& j* e- u
The implications of this reformulation can be seen, for example, in the following. "The psychosis," in this view, is not these supposedly underlying contents (in that sense everyone is "psychotic"). Rather, "the psychosis" is the curtailment or cessation of the interaction process of feeling and events. When, therefore, we label an individual "borderline psychotic," this does not mean that certain D.a.n.gerous contents lie down there in him. Rather, he is "isolated," "uninvolved," "not quite there," "withdrawn," or "out of touch with himself"; i.e., his manner of experiencing is highly structure bound. To prevent "the psychosis" from occurring, one must respond as much as possible to such feelings as do implicitly function, so as to carry forward and reconstitute ongoing interaction and experiencing.+ Q1 G/ K- {! x) I
The view of "latent psychotic contents" leads to two D.a.n.gerous errors: either one decides that the individual's feelings of difficulty and trouble had better be ignored (lest they "blossom into" full psychosis), or one "interprets" them and "digs" them "out." Either decision denies and pushes away the personal interaction and the individual's implicitly functioning feelings. Either decision will result in psychosis-they involve the same selfverifying misconception that "contents" are psychotic.! C( l( ^( i! E7 B/ G) d$ X
There is nothing "psychotic" about any "underlying contents." What is psychotic is the structure-bound manner of experiencing, the absence or literal rigidity of felt experiencing and interaction.
: [! I4 F( k8 f4 d7 B0 }1 D' `Whether "borderline" or seemingly "gone," the person will "come alive" if interaction and experiencing [25] is reconstituted by personal responses which carry forward what does still function .[26]

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26. CONTENT MUTATION.As implicitly functioning felt meanings are carried forward and the process is reconstituted and made more immediate in manner, there is a constant change in "content." As referent movement occurs, both symbolization and direct referent change. There is a sequence of successive "contents." Sometimes these successive contents are said to "emerge" as if they had always been there, or as if the final basic content is now finally revealed. But I prefer to call this content mutation. It is not a change only in how one interprets but, rather a change both in feeling and in symbols. The contents change because the process is being newly completed and reconstituted by responses. What the contents will be depends greatly on the responses.
9 h' \" ?& ~# ~. t' W, a9 D9 XAn example of content mutation has already been given (definitions 8-9). Here are more examples of content mutation:
+ B1 h# `1 R5 E0 t' Y0 UThe client is in terror. She says there will be "doom." The world will fly to pieces. Something awful will happen. There is a monster./ V; t1 ]- w/ U+ w: F/ c
Here is "the psychosis" someone might say. At any rate, a common enough psychotic content.) u* ~- s# F4 z" f
She is awfully afraid, she says. I respond that she is afraid and that I want to keep company and be with her, since she is afraid. She repeats that she is afraid. No matter how much or little meaningful symbology there is to the "doom," she is afraid now.
+ w8 e$ I/ s5 v$ }' n! `Minutes or months later she can say:1 }+ I3 k( T' e; h$ Q  n( K
"I'm afraid of being lost. I'm lost. I'm so lost!"" ~2 V$ A+ \( `
"For years I have had to know exactly what to do every moment. I'd plan to know exactly what to do so I'd be distracted. It's like blinders. I'd be afraid to look up, sort of. I need someone or something to hold on to, or I'll disappear."
- H7 h$ Y" o1 f+ g. l. G+ IThis is more understandable than world doom. The content seems now to be "objectloss" or "passive-dependent needs." Whatever it is, the response needed must provide contact: I grasp her hand; or I talk gently, saying something, pertinent or not-something from me to maintain contact and not to talk away the fear of being lost. In terms of process unity such talking and such touching are really the same, in that they both reestablish interaction. To do so it must be personal and it must convert the need to "hold on" into a successfully ongoing contact, real or symbolic.
- E4 |" P9 l0 B/ r9 p"I need to hold on, but I'm a monster. No one can love me. You must be sick of me. I need so much, all I do is need.: I'm just selfish and evil. I'll suck you dry if I can. I'm just a horrible mouth."
; q2 t9 u+ x0 [; R9 B) W' w9 X# zOral needs, oral incorporation, are now the contents that might be proposed.1 B. [& w4 u& }2 R4 G
But her need does feel endless, infinite, hungry. "Sure," I say, "It feels endless, bottomless, and awful to you. It's like you want to be fed and held forever."3 {" F3 g3 R8 a3 [/ ~3 l% N3 d
Then, or some other time, she may say: "I'm just a baby. I hate that child. An ugly child. I was an ugly child. Nobody could like me the way I am."
. L2 z0 r% f4 n, G- c  vBut we have come a long way when the monster is now a child! A child is quite a nice thing. What became of the monster? A child is quite a human, every day, daylight thing. What became of the terror? The psychosis?5 m+ ~0 g* P$ N$ c+ o9 w. c. z: _
Such content mutation can occur within a few minutes or over months. It may occur in such words and symbols as above or in purely socially acceptable language, or with bizarre incoherent words, or in silence. The point I am trying to make is that the content changes as one responds and thereby carries forward and reconstitutes an interaction process. Such interaction constitutes felt experiencing, and contents are always aspects thereof. As the process changes, the contents change. I term it content mutation.  S7 T9 R5 ~% K# p2 c  m; d
Content mutation occurs strikingly with so-called "psychotic contents." The monsters, weird fears, infinite hungers, and doom-expectant terrors are so often aspects of isolation, loss of self and interaction. They are not psychotic "things" in a person, but a narrowed or stopped interaction process. As the interaction process is restored the contents change and, also, they become more understandable and commonly human.. O: `# p' l# y! E0 Z& s- J3 ^
But content mutation occurs not only with quite dramatic expressions, such as in the above example. It occurs equally with the often silent, unexpressive, and "unmotivated" individuals with whom we have so largely been working in the current research on psychotherapy with schizophrenics (Rogers et al., 1961; Gendlin, 1961b, 1962a, 1962c), although these individuals often conceptualize so little of what they are feeling. The following is a further example of content mutation:
0 ?* B  m* d6 @9 I- T  vAn individual talks about a chain of circumstances which disturb him. Numerous patterns, characteristics, and personality "contents," seem noticeable in his report of these circumstances.* ^0 G- g5 G6 b! `/ x
Perhaps with the aid of responses, he goes on to find that this chain of circumstances really makes him very angry. That's it! He is furious. He wishes he could harm and destroy the people involved. He is afraid he will attack them when he next sees them. He hopes he will be able to control this destructive desire. He is amazed at his own hostility and his own fear of it. He hardly needs further to report the circumstances, so deeply true is his experience of this anger and destructive need. Again, now,' we are tempted to consider personality "contents." Our first deductions now seem too broad. Here, really, we have some contents of this man's personality. We are familiar with this fear of one's own hostility and what some of the bases of the hostility probably are.1 @. g( ]+ h: z. D% R8 q# ?
But let us say the man continues (and I continue to respond to his felt meanings). He imagines himself attempting to vent his anger at these people. He finds now that he is not afraid he will uncontrollably attack and harm them. It is more likely (of all things!) that he will not be able even to yell at them, because perhaps he will cry. His voice would choke up, he is sure. In fact, it is somewhat choked up right now. This thing is not really hostility, it now appears. It is rather that he feels so hurt! They should not have done this to him! They hurt him, and . . . what can he do? And now he feels, with some relief, that he finally is in touch with what all this really means to him. (We may now propose a third group of personality contents, again different.)8 _1 A0 B( }4 v7 o
But, as he continues, it turns out that the circumstances as such do not really matter. No wonder! It seemed all along quite a petty thing to be so upset about. The content is really something else and that is what hurts. And he finds now it is not a hurt after all. Rather, it brought home to him that he feels weak and helpless. "I'm not really hurt" (he now finds), "it's more that it points up to me how I can't make it in the world" (passivity, castration, we may now say).7 |( y; \7 e/ X
The term "content mutation" can be applied to this sequential shifting of what seems to be the "content." Contents are process aspects of ongoing feeling process. They can be symbolized because they function implicitly in that feeling process. As it is carried forward, there is referent movement and change in what can be symbolized. It is not merely a shifting of interpretation. There is referent movement--that is to say, that which is being symbolized is changing.. J8 Q! t0 J9 x# v  X
Content mutation does not imply that all our concepts are simply map, plicable. Often they are correct in terms of predicting the individual's other behaviors, and often they enable us to guess or be sensitively ready for a next content mutation. However, the concepts of personality contents are static and much too general [27] and empty. They are never a substitute for direct reference, referent movement, and content mutation.

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Eugene T. Gendlin, Ph.D.
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Eugene T. Gendlin received his Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Chicago and taught there from 1963 to 1995. His philosophical work is concerned especially with the relationship between logic and experiential explication. Implicit intricacy cannot be represented, but functions in certain ways in relation to philosophical discourse. The applications of this "Philosophy of the Implicit" have been important in many fields.
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His philosophical books and articles are listed and some of them are available from this web site. They include Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning, (in pa-perback) and Language Beyond Post-Modernism: Saying and Thinking In Gendlin's Philosophy (edited by David Levin) , both from Northwestern University Press, l997 and A Process Model.8 p" [( n- V" I6 p% r8 ~; H0 K
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Gendlin has been honored three times by the American Psychological Association for his development of Experiential Psychotherapy. He received the first "Distinguished Professional Psychologist of the Year" award from the Clinical Division, an award from the Philosophical Psychology Division, and he and The Focusing Institute received an award from the Humanistic Division in August of 2000.
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He was a founder and editor for many years of the Clinical Division Journal, Psychotherapy: Theory Research and Practice.  His book, Focusing, has sold over 400,000 copies and is in twelve languages. His other books include, Let Your Body Interpret Your Dreams, and Focusing-Oriented Psychotherapy.
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  \" b0 t$ U( m4 C' m6 Z' c2 bHe is internationally recognized as a major American philosopher and psychologist. - D7 Z8 O3 X0 Q$ @3 M, X
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Click here for a complete bibliography of Gendlin's philosophical and psychological publications.3 q: ?5 {" ?; Z

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This page was last modified on 13 September 2005
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