New Paradoxes of Risky Decision mak-ing
Michael H. Birnbaum
California State University, Fullerton and Decision Research Center, Fullerton
During the last 25 years, prospect theory and its successor, cumulative prospect theory, replaced expected
utility as the dominant descriptive theories of risky decision mak-ing. Although these models account for
the original Allais paradoxes, 11 new paradoxes show where prospect theories lead to self-contradiction
or systematic false predictions. The new findings are consistent with and, in several cases, were predicted
in advance by sim-ple “configural weight” models in which probability-consequence branches are
weighted by a function that depends on branch probability and ranks of consequences on discrete
branches. Although they have some similarities to later models called “rank-dependent utility,” configural
weight models do not satisfy coalescing, the assumption that branches leading to the same
consequence can be combined by adding their probabilities. Nor do they satisfy cancellation, the
“independence” assumption that branches common to both alternatives can be removed. The transfer of
attention exchange model, with parameters estimated from previous data, correctly predicts results with
all 11 new paradoxes. Apparently, people do not frame choices as prospects but, instead, as trees with
branches.
Keywords: cumulative prospect theory, decision mak-ing, expected utility, rank-dependent utility, paradox
这是行为决策最新的一篇总结过去研究和标出之后研究的焦点的论文。
[ 本帖最后由 帥子 于 2008-8-12 19:21 编辑 ]
